Anmerkungen:
In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 159, No. B, 2015
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 14, 2015 erstellt
Beschreibung:
We examine a model of dynamic screening and price discrimination in which the seller has limited commitment power. Two cohorts of anonymous, patient, and risk-neutral buyers arrive over two periods. Buyers in the first cohort arrive in period one, are privately informed about the distribution of their values, and then privately learn the value realizations in period two. Buyers in the second cohort are "last-minute shoppers" that already know their values upon their arrival in period two. The seller can fully commit to a long-term contract with buyers in the first cohort, but cannot commit to the future contractual terms that will be offered to second-cohort buyers. The expected second-cohort contract serves as an endogenous type-dependent outside option for first-cohort buyers, reducing the seller's ability to extract rents via sequential contracts. We derive the seller-optimal equilibrium and show that, when the seller cannot condition on future contractual terms (either explicitly or implicitly), she endogenously generates a commitment to maintaining high future prices by manipulating the timing of contracting