Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 1, 2007 erstellt
Beschreibung:
This paper criticizes the received distinction between complete and incomplete contracts, and argues that the nature of 'firm-like organization' cannot be understood within the frame of contingent contracting, neither complete nor incomplete. It proposes that 'firm-like' contracts are a particular case of complete uncontingent associational contracts over resource commitments, allowing the discovery of unknown streams of projects and tasks, complemented by an agreement on some (among many possible ones) fair procedures for task selection (rather than incomplete contingent contracts on tasks complemented by authority or power). A comparative assessment of open-ended associational contracts with respect to contingent contracting under varying levels of resource complementarity and uncertainty is offered. A revised version of this paper , titled 'Asset commitment, constitutional governance and the nature of the firm' has been published on the Journal of Institutional Economics, 6/3, 351-375, 2010