Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments June 9, 2022 erstellt
Beschreibung:
This study identifies stable coalition structures in generalized patent li- censing games with a specified payment scheme. In the model, each firm can agree to an exclusive contract with an external patent licensor for the patented technology on process innovation based on an ad-valorem (profit) royalty. However, each firm cannot be allowed to form any cartel in the production stage. We consider the core of induced coalition formation games for stability. We demonstrate that if we only allow deviations with the exogenously fixed payment scheme and payment rate, the coalition structures in which the number of licensee firms is at least one-half are stable. Moreover, if the payment rate for the patent holder is not too large, the converse result also holds. We discuss and compare our results with Watanabe and Muto’s (2008) impossibility result, which shows that almost all coalition structures cannot be in the core if we allow any type of deviations