Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 6, 2021 erstellt
Beschreibung:
Cardiovascular diseases (CVDs) are the leading cause of death worldwide, and one treatment for CVDs is what is known as "percutaneous coronary intervention" (PCI). Further, in this study, we consider the coronary stent, a medical device used in PCI. There are two common types of stents available: drug-eluting stents (DES) and bare-metal stents (BMS). While either type of device can be used for PCI, DES is more expensive and results in better health outcomes for high-risk patients. High prices of these devices can limit access to care, especially in developing countries. Additionally, healthcare providers may have monetary incentives to abuse DES even though it is not appropriate for all patients. Price regulations, e.g., a price cap on the stent devices by the government of India in 2017, could be used to improve healthcare access. In this paper, we study the unintended consequences of such regulations and propose alternatives to 1) improve access to care and 2) encourage appropriate use. We show that the currently prevalent policies fail to achieve these two objectives. Our proposed hybrid policy combines an overall price cap and an outcome-based subsidy and shows that under sufficient budget, such a policy aligns the provider's action to that of the social planner and achieves both objectives. With constrained budgets, there is a trade-off between the two objectives. In general, the regulator optimizes to ensure appropriate use at the expense of expanding access. However, when the budget is severely constrained, the regulator may permit misuse to widen healthcare access