Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 2003 erstellt
Beschreibung:
This paper advances a contextualist approach to empirical legal research, arguing that legal scholars should seek to map behavioral regularities in discrete legal contexts rather than develop a broad theory of legal judgment. The need for this cartographic approach to legal behavior, and the inadequacy of a strictly nomothetic approach, is illustrated through discussion of recent applications of heuristics and biases research to evidence law. Arguments for broad reforms of evidence law based on a "cognitive miser" view of legal judgment fail to recognize the contextual limitations on this model of human judgment and fail to provide the kinds of evidence that would justify reforms to evidence law. A set of key research questions and strategies for future studies of legal judgment and decision-making is proposed, with an emphasis on developing information about the practical significance and superability of judgmental biases and errors