Anmerkungen:
In: India Infrastructure Report 2010, Oxford Univ. Press
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments 2010 erstellt
Beschreibung:
Renewable energy sources (RES) have been promoted through a number of policies including subsidies and fiscal incentives, as well as regulatory provisions. Attractive fiscal policies like higher depreciation and the Renewable Portfolio Obligation (RPO) with Feed-in-Tariff (FiT) have provided significant impetus to growth of renewable energy in the electricity sector in India. Economic efficiency of renewable energy promotional policies like RPO with FiT has been questioned as these do not provide incentive for cost reduction and exploitation of costeffective resources with appropriate technology (Singh 2009). Tradable Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs) are identified as market-based instruments that can help promote RES in a cost-effective manner (Nielsen and Jeppesen 2003; Morthorst 2000; Voogt et al. 2000). Renewable Energy Credits or RECs are used as a disclosure, marketing and compliance mechanisms in a number of countries. These are called Renewable Obligation Certificates (ROCs) in the UK and ‘green tags’ or Tradable Green Certificates (TGCs) across many countries in the Europe, Guarantee of Origin (GO) or Renewable Energy Guarantee of Origin (REGO) is often used in the European Union (EU) as a disclosure mechanism. At least 21 REC schemes were under operation in a number of jurisdictions including the UK, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Australia, and numerous states in the US (Mendonca et al. 2010; Bertoldi and Huld 2006). In the Indian context, Singh (2006 and 2009) discusses the advantages of RECs and proposes its implementation to bring in economic efficiency in promotion of RES. The Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) has recently issued regulations for introducing a market for RECs in the country (CERC 2010a).This chapter critically examines the above regulations and identifies areas for improvement. We discuss the impact of market segmentation into solar and non solar RECs, and propose a multiplier scheme. The chapter demonstrates that the high level of floor and forbearance prices translate to a windfall gain and represent a higher implicit price of carbon, and need to be revisited. While presenting a mechanism for price discovery of RECs, it also highlights the importance of a buyout price. The chapter proposes a linkage between the FiT and REC mechanisms. It begins by highlighting the role of RECs in promoting RES in an economically efficient manner. We also present a framework for developing a market for RECs, and discuss institutional mechanisms and role of various stakeholders