Anmerkungen:
In: Der Gesellschafter, Linde Verlag, 2016:6, pp. 370-384
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 12, 2017 erstellt
Beschreibung:
German Abstract: Family Offices und Familienvermögen sind trotz ihrer praktischen Bedeutung bislang kaum Gegenstand rechtswissenschaftlicher Forschung. Dieser Beitrag widmet sich dieser Lücke aus rechtsvergleichender Sicht und untersucht die Organisation von Familienvermögen im Schnittfeld des Gesellschafts-, Finanzmarkt-, Kapitalmarkt-, Bilanz-, Verbraucherschutz- und Kartellrechts. Family Offices sind einerseits von vielen regulatorischen Pflichten freigestellt, andererseits kann die Zugehörigkeit zum Family Office Zurechnungs- und Haftungsgrund sein. Es zeigt sich, dass sich der Charakter von Family Offices mit den Generationen von einer unternehmerischen zu einer anlageorientierten Institution wandelt. Dieser Wandel ruft Gestaltungsfragen hervor und ruft die Frage hervor, ob die anfänglich gerechtfertigte Privilegierung von Family Offices auf Dauer Bestand haben sollte
English Abstract: Despite their significant size and practical importance family offices and family estates are rarely the subject of legal scholarship. This article in German language undertakes to fill that gap. It reveals that family offices and family estates are subject to an extensive body of law and regulation. The article analyzes the governance and legal structure of family offices in light of European and U.S. financial services law, the transparency of significant holdings, European market abuse and consumer protection regulation as well as contract, accounting and antitrust law. We show that family offices, in general, are subject to carve-outs and exemptions from investor and consumer protection regulations that may be best explained with Parliament's respect of inter-family ordering and hierarchy. While traditional structuring refers to unburdened day-to-day operations as core argument in favor of unregulated family offices in the form of trusts, foundations, establishments, companies or limited partnerships, we hold that regulated structures such as ('special', 'qualified' or 'sophisticated investor') investment funds hold some benefits. These benefits are the more important the more control is dispersed among family heirs. While starting out as controlled entity, with each generation passing through family offices come closer to ordinary collective investment schemes, turning the original entrepreneurial organization for which said carve-outs are warranted in an investment-only organizations which do not meed the rationale of said carve-out