Erschienen in:Resources for the Future Discussion Paper ; No. 13-07
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource (40 p)
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.2239883
Identifikator:
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 11, 2013 erstellt
Beschreibung:
When every individual's effort imposes negative externalities, self-interested behavior leads to socially excessive effort. To curb these excesses when effort cannot be monitored, competing output-sharing partnerships can form. With the right-sized groups, aggregate effort falls to the socially optimal level. We investigate this theory experimentally and find it makes correct qualitative predictions but there are systematic quantitative deviations, always in the direction of the socially optimal investment. By using data on subjects' conjectures of each other's behavior we show that deviations are consistent with both altruism and conformity (but not extremeness aversion)