Anmerkungen:
In: 78 University of Chicago Law Review 1431 (2011)
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments May 12, 2011 erstellt
Beschreibung:
Within the last two decades, Congress has passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). These Acts prevent federal and state officials from imposing a "substantial burden" on prisoners’ religious exercise, unless the burden advances "a compelling governmental interest... and is the least restrictive means of furthering that... interest." In accordance with these Acts, prison officials often allow inmates to read scriptures, attend services, eat religious foods, and participate in fasts. But what happens if officials provide accommodations and inmates fail to take advantage of them? Must prison officials continue accommodating these so-called "backsliding" prisoner? Circuits are split over this question. Specifically, courts have recently disagreed whether it is a "substantial burden" for prisons to withhold religious diets after prisoners fail to keep them. In Daly v Davis, the Seventh Circuit held that removing a violating prisoner from a kosher food program wasn’t a substantial burden under RFRA. On the other hand, in Lovelace v Lee, the Fourth Circuit held that removing one-time violators from a fasting program was a substantial burden under the equivalent RLUIPA standard, despite a lengthy dissent from Judge Harvie Wilkinson. This Comment analyzes the current debate and suggests a novel solution - one that addresses these questions and overcomes the weaknesses of the current approaches. Part I summarizes the First Amendment jurisprudence that led to RFRA and RLUIPA and briefly explains how courts have interpreted these Acts. Part II describes courts’ attempts to determine if removing violating prisoners from dietary accommodation programs is a substantial burden. Part III argues that courts are focusing on the wrong issue. Both sides rush to determine whether removing backsliding prisoners is a substantial burden, but both overlook the critical prior question: Is there even a burden on religious exercise? To answer this question, courts must know if prisoners hold sincere religious beliefs. I therefore argue that sincerity is the determinative inquiry when analyzing the claims of backsliding prisoners. Unfortunately, courts have not developed a formal sincerity test in RFRA and RLUIPA cases. Courts should remedy this problem by applying a modified version of the sincerity test developed for conscientious objectors to military service in Witmer v. United States. My approach allows sincere but imperfect prisoners to exercise their beliefs, but doesn’t force prison officials to accommodate mendacity