Erschienen in:Center for European, Governance and Economic Development (CEGE) Research ; No. 120
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource (23 p)
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.1803146
Identifikator:
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 5, 2011 erstellt
Beschreibung:
This paper presents a model showing an incentive for a group of people to vote for higher tuition fees, even if these fees have no quality effect. The incentive is based on a non-monetary influence on utility, namely the social status or prestige of graduating. The basic assumption is that the higher the prestige is, the lower the number of people studying. In a static equilibrium, it is shown that a group of wealthier and more able people can exist that attempts to prevent others from studying