• Medientyp: E-Book
  • Titel: Manager Replacement, Employee Protesting and Corporate Control
  • Beteiligte: Guo, Bing [VerfasserIn]
  • Erschienen: [S.l.]: SSRN, 2009
  • Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (38 p)
  • Sprache: Englisch
  • DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1495146
  • Identifikator:
  • Entstehung:
  • Anmerkungen: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments February 6, 2009 erstellt
  • Beschreibung: When faced with replacement threat, incumbent managers can look for support from employees to keep their position, by investing in an employee-friendly relationship. Enjoying such relationship, employees will help managers to preserve their job by protesting against shareholders. Interestingly, I find that when the benefits from the close relationship are large enough compared with the difference in managers' ability, shareholders' welfare increases with the investment in relationship and they prefer to share part of their power on the firm with employees. When considering industrial characteristics, shareholders, from industries where human capital is more important than physical assets, are more willing to share the power and managers are more willing to invest in the employee close relationship than those from the industries with less human capital importance
  • Zugangsstatus: Freier Zugang