Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 31, 2022 erstellt
Beschreibung:
Advancements in information technology enable new business models and new market mechanisms. Online crowdfunding is one such new mechanism, through which entrepreneurs can advertise their potential products and attract investment from the public. Four key features of online crowdfunding motivate our study: (i) entrepreneurs produce the products after their funding goals are reached; (ii) when backers fund the project, they observe product location and funding goal posted on the website but not product quality; (iii) some entrepreneurs are conscientious in the sense that they care about consumers with similar preferences; and (iv) entrepreneurs pay a commission to the platform. In this study, we advance the existing theory on online crowdfunding markets by analyzing a signaling game between heterogeneously motivated entrepreneurs and backers. We show that conscientious entrepreneurs create relatively high-quality projects, and they can signal their types under certain conditions. We further analyze how the commission rate of the platform can affect entrepreneurs’ and backers’ decisions, and so the platform’s future reputation for project quality. Finally, we identify the optimal commission rate of the platform