• Medientyp: E-Book
  • Titel: Tacit Collusion among Dominant Banks : Evidence from Round-Yard Loan Pricing
  • Beteiligte: Chan, Yu-Ju [Verfasser:in]; Lin, Chih-Yung [Verfasser:in]; Lin, Tse-Chun [Verfasser:in]
  • Erschienen: [S.l.]: SSRN, 2022
  • Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (56 p)
  • Sprache: Englisch
  • DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3905375
  • Identifikator:
  • Entstehung:
  • Anmerkungen: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments August 15, 2021 erstellt
  • Beschreibung: While there is no apparent reason for loan spreads to cluster at certain numbers, we find that around 70% of bank loans have round-yard spreads (i.e., multiples of 25 basis points). We hypothesize that dominant banks implicitly collude by using the round-yards as focal pricing points when negotiating with their borrowers. The tacit collusion leads to higher spreads and total costs of the round-yard-priced loans than non-round-yard-priced loans. Consistent with our tacit collusion hypothesis, dominant banks round up rather than round down loan spreads to multiples of yards. Moreover, round-yard pricing is more prevalent among lower-quality and non-repeat borrowers
  • Zugangsstatus: Freier Zugang