• Medientyp: E-Book
  • Titel: Competitive Model Selection in Algorithmic Targeting
  • Beteiligte: Iyer, Ganesh [VerfasserIn]; Ke, T. Tony [VerfasserIn]
  • Körperschaft: National Bureau of Economic Research
  • Erschienen: Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2023
  • Erschienen in: NBER working paper series ; no. w31002
  • Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource; illustrations (black and white)
  • Sprache: Englisch
  • Schlagwörter: Marktsegmentierung ; Modellierung ; Algorithmus ; Wettbewerb ; IT-gestütztes Marketing ; Theorie ; Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Advertising ; Arbeitspapier ; Graue Literatur
  • Reproduktionsnotiz: Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
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  • Beschreibung: This paper studies how market competition influences the algorithmic design choices of firms in the context of targeting. Firms face the general trade-off between bias and variance when choosing the design of a supervised learning algorithm in terms of model complexity or the number of predictors to accommodate. Each firm then appoints a data analyst that uses the chosen algorithm to estimate demand for multiple consumer segments, based on which, it devises a targeting policy to maximize estimated profit. We show that competition may induce firms to strategically choose simpler algorithms which involve more bias. This implies that more complex/flexible algorithms tend to have higher value for firms with greater monopoly power