Beschreibung:
We find a positive association between the general ability of chief executive officers (CEOs) and the magnitude of carbon emissions in carbon-emitting firms (CEFs). Furthermore, we find that generalist CEOs can influence carbon emission decisions reluctantly when CEFs’ transparency on environmental disclosure is poor, expenditure on research and development is minimal, product market competition is intense, CEO-pay-slice compared to other top executives is higher, and when the investor myopia is prominent. Overall, our findings align with the notion that with higher job security, the generalist CEOs may be willing to cannibalize their previously earned reputation for short-term gain and personal benefits. However, our additional findings suggest that the financial market does not appreciate such immoral behavior by the generalist CEOs in the long run as they end up paying more for raising external capital. Our findings are robust to considerations of alternate measures of our main variables and several tests for endogeneity concerns