• Medientyp: E-Book
  • Titel: How Does Moral Hazard Impact Critical Market Banking Performance?
  • Beteiligte: Williams, Corey [VerfasserIn]
  • Erschienen: [S.l.]: SSRN, 2023
  • Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (53 p)
  • Sprache: Englisch
  • DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4375043
  • Identifikator:
  • Schlagwörter: scale economies ; too-big-to-fail ; semiparametric smooth coefficient ; seemingly unrelated regressions
  • Entstehung:
  • Anmerkungen: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 1, 2023 erstellt
  • Beschreibung: The degree to which financial institutions form expectations of policy intervention despite their own risk appetites lies at the heart of macrofinancial regulations such as the Dodd-Frank and Consumer Protection Acts. The effectiveness of these policies hinge on the assumption that large banks are the only banks that are too-big-to-fail (TBTF). However, alternative perspectives posit that banks may be too-complex-to-fail, regardless of their size. To remedy competing TBTF definitions, we propose a new criterion to identify potential TBTF banks by their relative involvement in so-called critical markets, considerate of both bank size and complexity. We estimate a restricted translog semiparametric smooth coefficient seemingly unrelated regressions model (SPSC SUR) wherein model elasticities are functions of nonperforming assets, a proxy for moral hazard, to derive nonperformance-adjusted returns-to-scale estimates for critical market banks from 2001 through 2021. Over our full sample, the median critical market bank tends to operate under increasing returns-to-scale while half of all critical market banks exhibit slight decreasing returns-to-scale. Results taken over the past two decades suggest that most TBTF banks have exhausted their economies of scale concurrent with the shrinking competitive landscape
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