Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments January 20, 2023 erstellt
Beschreibung:
We analyze takeover operations in which (i) bidding firms are risk-averse; (ii) offers can be made using cash or equity stakes; and (iii) acquirers have asymmetric information. We consider both non-competitive operations, in which a single acquirer initiates the takeover, and competitive operations, in which the target organizes an informal auction across potential bidders. We provide conditions for the existence of a pooling and a separating equilibrium under both scenarios and characterize the optimal structure of offers. Additionally, we show the existence of a separating equilibrium under competition, in which firms differ in their payment methods to take advantage of the asymmetries in information. As such, we are able to reconcile the extant theoretical models with the empirical evidence observed in markets with a high volume of operations