Beschreibung:
We examine how caste identity affects ingroup voluntary contribution to public goods using a lab-in-the-field experiment in rural India with members from the top and bottom of the caste hierarchy. Using a 2-person public good game with homogenous groups, we empirically test (i) whether a caste gap in contributions emerge when group identities are made salient (ii) whether these differences are driven by the threat of punishment and trust, and (iii) whether exogenously boosting caste identities by a role model prime affects the “caste gap” in contributions. Our results show that groups with negative stereotypes (low-status groups) provide lower contributions to the public good, but only when their caste identity is revealed. We find only weak support for the idea that cooperation among high-status groups is enforced through punishment: the threat of punishment does not differentially affect contributions in low and high-status groups, but members of high-status groups do punish slightly more than members of low-status groups. Positive role model primes affect contributions positively for both groups, but the effect is larger for low-status groups, thereby decreasing the “caste-gap” in contributions. Role model primes may be effective in promoting positive and counteracting negative stereotypes, and favourably impact public goods provisions