Erschienen in:Politics and Governance ; 9 (2021), 2, Seite 163-172
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource (10 Seiten)
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.17645/pag.v9i2.3891
ISSN:
2183-2463
Identifikator:
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Beschreibung:
Abstract: Fiscal policy surveillance, including the possibility to impose financial sanctions, has been an important feature of Economic and Monetary Union since its inception. With the reform of fiscal rules in the aftermath of the financial and sovereign debt crisis, coercive provisions have been made stricter and the Commission has formally gained power vis-à-vis the Council. Nevertheless, sanctions under the Stability and Growth Pact for budgetary non-compliance have so far not been imposed. This article asks why the Commission has until now refrained from proposing such sanctions. Using minimalist process-tracing methods, three post-crisis cases in which the imposition of fines was possible, are analysed. Applying an adaptation of normative institutionalism, it is argued that the mechanism entitled "normative-strategic minimum enforcement" provides an explanation of why no sanctions are imposed in the cases studied: Given that the Commission does not perceive punitive action as appropri