• Medientyp: E-Book
  • Titel: Central Bank Credibility and Fiscal Responsibility
  • Beteiligte: Schreger, Jesse [VerfasserIn]; Yared, Pierre [VerfasserIn]; Zaratiegui, Emilio [VerfasserIn]
  • Körperschaft: National Bureau of Economic Research
  • Erschienen: Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2023
  • Erschienen in: NBER working paper series ; no. w31246
  • Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource; illustrations (black and white)
  • Sprache: Englisch
  • Schlagwörter: Zentralbank ; Geldpolitik ; Glaubwürdigkeit ; Neoklassische Synthese ; General ; Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy ; Other ; Monetary Policy ; Arbeitspapier ; Graue Literatur
  • Reproduktionsnotiz: Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
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  • Beschreibung: We consider a New Keynesian model with strategic monetary and fiscal interactions. The fiscal authority maximizes social welfare. Monetary policy is delegated to a central bank with an anti-inflation bias that suffers from a lack of commitment. The impact of central bank hawkishness on debt issuance is non-monotonic because increased hawkishness reduces the benefit from fiscal stimulus while simultaneously increasing real debt capacity. Starting from high levels of hawkishness (dovishness), a marginal increase in the central bank's anti-inflation bias decreases (increases) debt issuance