Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 15, 2023 erstellt
Beschreibung:
We characterize an efficient, budget-balanced, incentive-compatible mechanism in a general dynamic environment with private values and independent types in which agents observe private information and public decisions are made over time. Each agent guarantees himself an expected payoff by being truthful, and those guaranteed payoffs add up to the highest total ex-ante expected surplus. This implies that all Nash equilibria are payoff-equivalent, and the mechanism is collusion-proof. Our results remain intact if agents choose private actions and observe true past types of other agents. The properties of our mechanism stand in stark contrast to the Balanced Team Mechanism (Athey and Segal (2013)) and Dynamic Pivot Mechanism (Bergemann and Valimaki (2010)), which, as we show, might admit only inefficient equilibria after the elimination of weakly dominated strategies