Anmerkungen:
In: Proceedings of the 8th Conference on Regulating for Decent Work, International Labour Office, Geneva, 10–12 July 2023
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments June 14, 2023 erstellt
Beschreibung:
YouTube is probably the world’s largest digital labour platform. YouTube creators report similar decent work deficits as other platform workers: economic and psychosocial impacts from opaque, error-prone algorithmic management; no collective bargaining; and possible employment misclassification. In December 2021, the European Commission announced a new proposal for a Directive ‘on improving working conditions in platform work’ (the ‘Platform Work Directive’). However, the definition of ‘platform work’ in the proposed Directive may exclude YouTube.Commercial laws, however, may apply. In the US state of California, for example, Civil Code §1749.7 (previously AB 1790 [2019]) governs the relationship between ‘marketplaces’ and ‘marketplace sellers.’ In the European Union, Regulation 2019/1150 (the ‘Platform-to-Business Regulation’) similarly provides protections to ‘business users of online intermediation services.’While the protections provided by these ‘marketplace laws’ are less comprehensive than those provided by the proposed Platform Work Directive, they might address some of the decent work deficits experienced by workers on content marketplaces, especially those arising from opaque and error-prone algorithmic management practices. Yet they have gone relatively underexamined in policy discussions on improving working conditions in platform work. Additionally, to our knowledge they have not been used or referred to in any legal action or public dispute against YouTube or any other digital labour platform.This paper uses the case of YouTube to consider the regulatory situation of ‘content marketplaces,’ a category of labour platform defined in the literature on working conditions in platform work but underdiscussed in policy research and proposals on platform work regulation—at least compared to location-based, microtask, and freelance platforms. The paper makes four contributions. First, it summarizes the literature on YouTube creators’ working conditions and collective action efforts, highlighting that creators on YouTube and other content marketplaces face similar challenges to other platform workers. Second, it considers the definition of ‘digital labour platform’ in the proposed EU Platform Work Directive and notes that YouTube and other content marketplaces may be excluded, despite their relevance. Third, it compares the California and EU ‘marketplace laws’ to the proposed Platform Work Directive, concluding that the marketplace laws, while valuable, do not fully address the decent work deficits experienced by content marketplace creators. Fourth, it presents policy options for addressing these deficits from the perspective of international labour standards