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Medientyp:
Buch
Titel:
Delegation and agency in international organizations
Enthält:
Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal agent theory
/ Darren Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney
Variation in principal preferences, structure, decision rules, and private benefits ; Who delegates? : alternative models of principals in development aid
/ Mona Lyne, Daniel Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney
US domestic politics and International Monetary Fund policy
/ J. Lawrence Broz and Michael Brewster Hawes
Why multilateralism? : foreign aid and domestic principal-agent problems
/ Helen V. Milner
Distribution, information, and delegation to international organizations : the case of IMF conditionality
/ Lisa L. Martin
Delegation and discretion in the European Union
/ Mark A. Pollack
Variation in agent preferences, legitimacy, tasks, and permeability ; How agents matter
/ Darren G. Hawkins and Wade Jacoby
Screening power : international organizations as informative agents
/ Alexander Thompson
Dutiful agents, rogue actors, or both? : staffing, voting rules, and slack in the WHO and WTO
/ Andrew P. Cortell and Susan Peterson
Delegating IMF conditionality : understanding variations in control and conformity
/ Erica R. Gould
Delegation to international courts and the limits of re-contracting political power
/ Karen J. Alter
Directions for future research ; The logic of delegation to international organizations
/ David A. Lake and Mathew D. McCubbins.
Anmerkungen:
Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke
Includes bibliographical references (p. 369 - 393) and index
Enth. 12 Beitr
Beschreibung:
Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal agent theory / Darren Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney -- Variation in principal preferences, structure, decision rules, and private benefits -- Who delegates? : alternative models of principals in development aid / Mona Lyne, Daniel Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney -- US domestic politics and International Monetary Fund policy / J. Lawrence Broz and Michael Brewster Hawes -- Why multilateralism? : foreign aid and domestic principal-agent problems / Helen V. Milner -- Distribution, information, and delegation to international organizations : the case of IMF conditionality / Lisa L. Martin -- Delegation and discretion in the European Union / Mark A. Pollack -- Variation in agent preferences, legitimacy, tasks, and permeability -- How agents matter / Darren G. Hawkins and Wade Jacoby -- Screening power : international organizations as informative agents / Alexander Thompson -- Dutiful agents, rogue actors, or both? : staffing, voting rules, and slack in the WHO and WTO / Andrew P. Cortell and Susan Peterson -- Delegating IMF conditionality : understanding variations in control and conformity / Erica R. Gould -- Delegation to international courts and the limits of re-contracting political power / Karen J. Alter -- Directions for future research -- The logic of delegation to international organizations / David A. Lake and Mathew D. McCubbins