• Medientyp: E-Book
  • Titel: Risk and the role of collateral in debt renegotiation
  • Beteiligte: Neus, Werner [VerfasserIn]; Stadler, Manfred [VerfasserIn]
  • Erschienen: Tübingen: Universitätsbibliothek Tübingen, 2011
  • Erschienen in: Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen: University of Tübingen working papers in economics and finance ; 16
  • Umfang: Online-Ressource
  • Sprache: Englisch
  • Identifikator:
  • Schlagwörter: Schulden ; Verhandlungstheorie ; Kreditsicherung ; Investitionsrisiko ; Stochastischer Prozess ; Theorie ; Arbeitspapier ; Graue Literatur
  • Entstehung:
  • Anmerkungen: Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
  • Beschreibung: In his basic model of debt renegotiation, BESTER [1994] argues that collateral is more effective if high risk projects are financed. This result, however, crucially depends on the definition of risk. Using the second-order stochastic dominance criterion introduced by ROTHSCHILD AND STIGLITZ [1970], we show that it is not a project's high risk, induced by a high probability of default, that makes collateral more effective. Instead it turns out that, given the expected return, the probability of default has no impact on the collateral's effectiveness. Moreover, a higher risk of the project caused by a higher loss given default makes the use of collateral even less effective. -- Debt renegotiation ; Collateral ; Risk ; Stochastic dominance
  • Zugangsstatus: Freier Zugang