• Medientyp: E-Book
  • Titel: On repeated games with imperfect public monitoring : from discrete to continuous time
  • Beteiligte: Staudigl, Mathias [Verfasser:in]; Steg, Jan-Henrik [Verfasser:in]
  • Erschienen: Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, IMW, 2014
  • Erschienen in: Universität Bielefeld: Working papers ; 52500
  • Umfang: Online-Ressource (38 S.)
  • Sprache: Englisch
  • DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2497608
  • Identifikator:
  • Schlagwörter: Arbeitspapier ; Graue Literatur
  • Entstehung:
  • Anmerkungen: Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
  • Beschreibung: Motivated by recent path-breaking contributions in the theory of repeated games in continuous time, this paper presents a family of discrete-time games which provides a consistent discrete-time approximation of the continuous-time limit game. Using probabilistic arguments, we prove that continuous-time games can be defined as the limit of a sequence of discrete-time games. Our convergence analysis reveals various intricacies of continuous-time games. First, we demonstrate the importance of correlated strategies in continuous-time. Second, we attach a precise meaning to the statement that a sequence of discrete-time games can be used to approximate a continuous-time game.
  • Zugangsstatus: Freier Zugang