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Medientyp:
Sonstige Veröffentlichung;
E-Artikel
Titel:
Partisan science and the democratic legitimacy ideal
Beteiligte:
Hilligardt, Hannah
[VerfasserIn]
Erschienen:
Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V, 2023
Erschienen in:Synthese: An International Journal for Epistemology, Methodology and Philosophy of Science 202 (2023), Nr. 5 ; Synthese: An International Journal for Epistemology, Methodology and Philosophy of Science
Anmerkungen:
Diese Datenquelle enthält auch Bestandsnachweise, die nicht zu einem Volltext führen.
Beschreibung:
The democratic legitimacy ideal requires value judgments in science to be legitimised by democratic procedures in order for them to reflect the public interest or democratic aims. Such a view has been explicitly defended by Intemann (2015) and Schroeder (2021), amongst others, and reflects a more widely shared commitment to a democratisation of science and integration of public participation procedures. This paper suggests that the democratic legitimacy ideal in its current form does not leave space for partisan science – science that is politically or societally engaged. This is problematic because partisan research can contribute substantially to science and society, a point that I will illustrate with a recent case study from the Netherlands. To resolve this problem, I scrutinise the notion of democratic legitimacy and consider its use in the values in science discourse. Current discussions focus on democratic decision-making procedures to legitimise specific value judgements. I show that this focus does not adequately represent sound procedures of legitimisation at the hand of political theories of representation. Consequently, I develop a different approach: I propose to consider scientists as a special case of representatives who are authorised to make independent value judgements while nevertheless being constrained by the demands of their constituencies. Based on this approach, I argue that values in science do not need to be based on democratically agreed upon aims or the public interest in every instance. Instead, I advocate for a pluralist system of scientific mandates, which differs from both value pluralism and the democratic legitimacy ideal.