• Medientyp: E-Artikel
  • Titel: Auctioning the right to play ultimatum games and the impact on equilibrium selection
  • Beteiligte: Shachat, Jason [Verfasser:in]; Swarthout, J. Todd [Verfasser:in]
  • Erschienen: Basel: MDPI, 2013
  • Sprache: Englisch
  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/g4040738
  • ISSN: 2073-4336
  • Schlagwörter: auction ; forward induction ; ultimatum bargaining ; loss avoidance
  • Entstehung:
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  • Beschreibung: We auction scarce rights to play the Proposer and Responder positions in ultimatum games. As a control treatment, we randomly allocate these rights and charge exogenous participation fees. These participation fee sequences match the auction price sequence from a session of the original treatment. With endogenous selection via auctions, we find that play converges to a session-specific Nash equilibrium, and auction prices emerge supporting this equilibrium by the principle of forward induction. With random assignment, we find play also converges to a session-specific Nash equilibrium as predicted by the principle of loss avoidance. While Nash equilibria with low offers are observed, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium never is.
  • Zugangsstatus: Freier Zugang
  • Rechte-/Nutzungshinweise: Namensnennung (CC BY)