• Medientyp: Elektronischer Konferenzbericht
  • Titel: Team incentives and performance: Evidence from a retail chain
  • Beteiligte: Friebel, Guido [VerfasserIn]; Heinz, Matthias [VerfasserIn]; Krueger, Miriam [VerfasserIn]; Zubanov, Nikolay [VerfasserIn]
  • Erschienen: Kiel, Hamburg: ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, 2017
  • Sprache: Englisch
  • Schlagwörter: insider econometrics ; M5 ; L2 ; management practices ; field experiment ; wage inequality ; J3 ; randomized controlled trial (RCT)
  • Entstehung:
  • Anmerkungen: Diese Datenquelle enthält auch Bestandsnachweise, die nicht zu einem Volltext führen.
  • Beschreibung: In a field experiment with a retail chain (1,300 employees, 193 shops), randomly selected sales teams received a bonus. The bonus increases both sales and number of customers dealt with by 3%. Each dollar spent on the bonus generates $3.80 in sales, and $2.10 in profit. Wages increase by 2.2% while inequality rises only moderately. The analysis suggests effort complementarities to be important, and the effectiveness of peer pressure in overcoming free-riding to be limited. After rolling out the bonus, treatment and control shops’ performance converge, suggesting long-term stability of the treatment effect.
  • Zugangsstatus: Freier Zugang