• Medientyp: E-Book; Bericht
  • Titel: More effort with less pay: On information avoidance, optimistic beliefs, and performance
  • Beteiligte: Huck, Steffen [VerfasserIn]; Szech, Nora [VerfasserIn]; Wenner, Lukas M. [VerfasserIn]
  • Erschienen: Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), 2017
  • Sprache: Englisch
  • Schlagwörter: belief design ; D83 ; D84 ; real effort task ; coarse incentive structures ; workplace incentives ; M52 ; performance ; J31 ; optimal expectations
  • Entstehung:
  • Anmerkungen: Diese Datenquelle enthält auch Bestandsnachweise, die nicht zu einem Volltext führen.
  • Beschreibung: Recent behavioral models argue in favor of avoidance of instrumental information. We explore the role of information avoidance in a real-effort setting. Our experiment offers three main results. First, we confirm that preferences for avoidance of instrumental information exist, studying information structures on performance pay. Second, information avoiders outperform information receivers. This result holds independently of effects of self-selection. Third, the findings support theories on information avoidance that favor an optimistic belief design rather than theories that rationalize such behavior as a way to mitigate selfcontrol problems. This suggests that coarse information structures lead agents to distort their beliefs away from the objective prior. ; June 2015 (2nd revision November 2017)
  • Zugangsstatus: Freier Zugang