Sie können Bookmarks mittels Listen verwalten, loggen Sie sich dafür bitte in Ihr SLUB Benutzerkonto ein.
Medientyp:
E-Book;
Bericht
Titel:
An Experiment On Social Mislearning
Beteiligte:
Eyster, Erik
[VerfasserIn];
Rabin, Matthew
[VerfasserIn];
Weizsäcker, Georg
[VerfasserIn]
Erschienen:
München und Berlin: Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, 2018
Anmerkungen:
Diese Datenquelle enthält auch Bestandsnachweise, die nicht zu einem Volltext führen.
Beschreibung:
We investigate experimentally whether social learners appreciate the redundancy of information conveyed by their observed predecessors\' actions. Each participant observes a private signal and enters an estimate of the sum of all earlier-moving participants\' signals plus her own. In a first treatment, participants move single-file and observe all predecessors\' entries; Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) predicts that each participant simply add her signal to her immediate predecessor\'s entry. Although 75% of participants do so, redundancy neglect by the other 25% generates excess imitation and mild inefficiencies. In a second treatment, participants move four per period; BNE predicts that most players anti-imitate some observed entries. Such anti-imitation occurs in 35% of the most transparent cases, and 16% overall. The remaining redundancy neglect creates dramatic excess imitation and inefficiencies: late-period entries are far too extreme, and on average participants would earn substantially more by ignoring their predecessors altogether.