Stefan, Matthias
[Verfasser:in];
Huber, Jürgen
[Verfasser:in];
Kirchler, Michael
[Verfasser:in];
Sutter, Matthias
[Verfasser:in];
Walzl, Markus
[Verfasser:in]
Monetary and Social Incentives in Multi-Tasking: The Ranking Substitution Effect
Anmerkungen:
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Beschreibung:
Rankings are prevalent information and incentive tools in labor markets with strong competition for talent. In a dynamic model of multi-tasking and an accompanying experiment with financial professionals, we identify hidden ranking costs when performance in one task is incentivized and ranked while another prosocial task is not: (i) a ranking influences behavior if individuals lag behind: they spend more total effort and substitute effort in the prosocial task with effort in the ranked task; (ii) those ahead in the ranking spend less total effort and lower relative effort in the ranked task. Implications for incentive schemes are discussed.