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Beschreibung:
This paper tests the ‘Too‐Big‐to‐Fail’ hypothesis that whether being designated as a global systemically important bank (G‐SIB) has an impact on the credit default swap (CDS) price of the bank, thereby reducing its credit risk. We find surprising evidence that the CDS spreads of a bank increase (decrease) after the announcement of a higher (lower) capital surcharge. However, this effect is temporary, as the mean CDS spreads revert to preannouncement level, dropping sharply after the initial rise. These findings create a puzzle by implying that a higher capital surcharge requirement and more stringent regulation could outweigh the implicit subsidy advantages of being too‐big‐to‐fail.