• Medientyp: Sonstige Veröffentlichung; Elektronischer Konferenzbericht; E-Artikel
  • Titel: Optimal Design of Tokenized Markets
  • Beteiligte: Lee, Michael Junho [Verfasser:in]; Martin, Antoine [Verfasser:in]; Townsend, Robert M. [Verfasser:in]
  • Erschienen: Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, 2022
  • Sprache: Englisch
  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2021.8
  • Schlagwörter: settlement uncertainty ; asymmetric information ; programmability ; Tokenization
  • Entstehung:
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  • Beschreibung: Trades in today’s financial system are inherently subject to settlement uncertainty. This paper explores tokenization as a potential technological solution. A token system, by enabling programmability of assets, can be designed to eradicate settlement uncertainty. We study the allocations achieved in a decentralized market with either the legacy settlement system or a token system. Tokenization can improve efficiency in markets subject to a limited commitment problem. However, it also materially alters the information environment, which in turn aggravates a hold-up problem. This limits potential gains from resolving settlement uncertainty, particularly for markets that depend on intermediaries.
  • Zugangsstatus: Freier Zugang