• Medientyp: Sonstige Veröffentlichung; E-Artikel; Elektronischer Konferenzbericht
  • Titel: A Tight Bound on Multiple Spending in Decentralized Cryptocurrencies
  • Beteiligte: Bezerra, João Paulo [Verfasser:in]; Kuznetsov, Petr [Verfasser:in]
  • Erschienen: Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, 2024
  • Sprache: Englisch
  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.31
  • Schlagwörter: asset transfer ; Quorum systems ; accountability ; consistency measure ; decentralized trust
  • Entstehung:
  • Anmerkungen: Diese Datenquelle enthält auch Bestandsnachweise, die nicht zu einem Volltext führen.
  • Beschreibung: The last decade has seen a variety of Asset-Transfer systems designed for decentralized environments. The major problem these systems address is double-spending, and solving it inherently imposes strong trust assumptions on the system participants. In this paper, we take a non-orthodox approach to the double-spending problem that might suit better realistic environments in which these systems are to be deployed. We consider the decentralized trust setting, where each user may independently choose who to trust by forming their local quorums. In this setting, we define k-Spending Asset Transfer, a relaxed version of asset transfer which bounds the number of times a system participant may spend an asset it received. We establish a precise relationship between the decentralized trust assumptions and k, the optimal spending number of the system.
  • Zugangsstatus: Freier Zugang