Beschreibung:
This chapter focuses on the repeated games of incomplete information to analyze the strategic aspects of information: When and at what rate to reveal information, when and how to conceal information, and what resources to allocate for acquiring information. Repeated games provide the natural paradigm for dealing with these dynamic aspects of information. The repetitions of the game serve as a signaling mechanism that is the channel through which information is transmitted from one period to another. Most of the work on repeated games of incomplete information was done for two-person, zero-sum games discussed in this chapter. This is not only because it is the simplest and most natural case to start with, but also because it captures the main problems and aspects of strategic transmission of information, which can therefore be studied isolated from the phenomena of cooperation, punishments, incentives, etc. The theory of nonzero-sum repeated games of incomplete information makes extensive use of the notion of punishment which is based on the minmax value borrowed from the zero-sum case.