Moore, Alexander
[VerfasserIn]
;
Moore, Alexander
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Dethier, Jean-Jacques
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Straub, Stéphane
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]
Regulation, Renegotiation and Capital Structure
: Theory and Evidence from Latin American Transport Concessions
Erschienen:
Washington, D.C: The World Bank, 2013 2013
Umfang:
Online-Ressource (29 p)
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.1596/1813-9450-6646
Identifikator:
Reproduktionsreihe:
World Bank eLibrary
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Beschreibung:
The paper examines the capital structure of regulated infrastructure firms. The authors develop a model showing that leverage, the ratio of liabilities to assets, is lower under high-powered regulation and that firms operating under high-powered regulation make proportionally larger reductions in leverage when the cost of debt increases. They test the predictions of the model using an original panel dataset of 124 transport concessions in Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru over 1992-2011, finding broad support for our predictions