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Medientyp:
E-Artikel
Titel:
Why Do Boards Exist? Governance Design in the Absence of Corporate Law
Beteiligte:
Burkart, Mike;
Miglietta, Salvatore;
Ostergaard, Charlotte
Erschienen:
Oxford University Press (OUP), 2023
Erschienen in:The Review of Financial Studies
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.1093/rfs/hhac072
ISSN:
0893-9454;
1465-7368
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Beschreibung:
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title>
<jats:p>We study under which circumstances firms choose to install boards and their roles in a historical setting in which neither boards nor their duties are mandated by law. Boards arise in firms with large, heterogeneous shareholder bases. We propose that an important role of boards is to mediate between heterogeneous shareholders with divergent interests. Voting restrictions are common and ensure that boards are representative and not captured by large blockholders. Boards are given significant powers to both mediate and monitor management, and these roles are intrinsically linked.</jats:p>