> Detailanzeige

Spykman, Imke; Blenke, Tobias; Büchner, Sebastian; Degering, Detlev; Eleftheriadis, Konstantinos; Fischer, Helmut W.; Lasche, George; Masson, Olivier; Mietelski, Jerzy W.; Ransby, Daniela; Renz, Franz; Souti, Maria‐Evangelia; Zok, Dorian; Steinhauser, Georg

Searching for the “smoking gun” of the miscarried 2019 Nenoksa nuclear cruise missile test: a null result

Literatur-
verwaltung

Zur
Merkliste

Lösche von
Merkliste

Per Whatsapp teilen

Schließen

Merkliste



Sie können Bookmarks mittels Listen verwalten, loggen Sie sich dafür bitte in Ihr SLUB Benutzerkonto ein.
  • Medientyp: E-Artikel
  • Titel: Searching for the “smoking gun” of the miscarried 2019 Nenoksa nuclear cruise missile test: a null result
  • Beteiligte: Spykman, Imke; Blenke, Tobias; Büchner, Sebastian; Degering, Detlev; Eleftheriadis, Konstantinos; Fischer, Helmut W.; Lasche, George; Masson, Olivier; Mietelski, Jerzy W.; Ransby, Daniela; Renz, Franz; Souti, Maria‐Evangelia; Zok, Dorian; Steinhauser, Georg
  • Erschienen: Wiley, 2021
  • Erschienen in: Zeitschrift für anorganische und allgemeine Chemie, 647 (2021) 4, Seite 350-358
  • Sprache: Englisch
  • DOI: 10.1002/zaac.202000291
  • ISSN: 0044-2313; 1521-3749
  • Schlagwörter: Inorganic Chemistry
  • Entstehung:
  • Anmerkungen:
  • Beschreibung: AbstractOn August 8, 2019, an explosion of a military missile occurred at the Nenoksa (also transcribed as Nyonoksa) Missile Test Center (Russian Federation). Russian authorities confirmed a release of radioactive material in the course of this incident, which fueled rumors that it could have involved a nuclear‐propelled missile of the Burevestnik/Skyfall type. In this study, our radioanalytical efforts are summarized searching for the “smoking gun” of the incident. These included the gamma‐measurements of air filters from two vessels that were in some proximity to the event as well as one Greek high‐volume air filter. In addition, we tested the hypothesis that radioactive 42Ar may have been used to operate a radiothermal generator. If the incident had released 42Ar, it may have become detectable by measuring characteristic gamma radiation emitted from a tank containing liquefied atmospheric argon. No traces whatsoever were found that could provide clues about the release. It is possible that the presumably small amounts of radionuclides released from either a small nuclear reactor or a powerful radionuclide source dispersed quickly over Russian territory to non‐detectable levels before reaching any of our assayed samples.