Beschreibung:
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>Is there a moral requirement to assist wild animals suffering due to natural causes? According to the <jats:italic>laissez-faire intuition</jats:italic>, although we may have <jats:italic>special</jats:italic> duties to assist wild animals, there are no <jats:italic>general</jats:italic> requirements to care for them. If this view is right, then our positive duties toward wild animals can be only special, grounded in special circumstances. In this article I present the <jats:italic>contribution argument</jats:italic> which employs the thought that the receipt of benefits from wild animals is one such kind of special circumstance. If this argument is correct, then the circle of moral agents required to assist some wild animals is significantly widened.</jats:p>