Beschreibung:
<jats:p>Party “intent” is not one of the tools that the <jats:uri xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:type="simple" xlink:href="https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201155/volume-1155-i-18232-english.pdf">Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties</jats:uri> (VCLT) gives to treaty interpreters. To be sure, party intent is presumably reflected in the “object and purpose” of the treaty, but it is not a separate criterion; in fact, the VCLT implicitly excludes party intent from playing an interpretive role. Yet many decision-makers, counsel, and academics persistently look to party intent for guidance when interpreting treaties. The most favored nation (MFN) debate illustrates why party intent endures as an interpretive touchstone: treaty language, even when analyzed in context and in light of the convention's object and purpose, does not always lead to clear answers. Both <jats:uri xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:type="simple" xlink:href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-journal-of-international-law/article/new-debate-on-the-interpretation-of-mfn-clauses-in-investment-treaties-putting-the-brakes-on-multilateralization/6FDC810ACF931631C322FB971EA76E64">Simon Batifort and J. Benton Heath</jats:uri> and <jats:uri xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:type="simple" xlink:href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-journal-of-international-law/article/mfn-clauses-as-bilateral-commitments-to-multilateralism-a-reply-to-simon-batifort-and-j-benton-heath/8783152F1E213758838CE524FE720F94">Stephan Schill</jats:uri>, in their different ways, depart from traditional VCLT analysis and hark to party intent as a reason to endorse a modified approach to treaty interpretation. Yet they also illustrate why party intent is an imperfect tool: party intent is too malleable to be a conclusive guide to treaty meaning.</jats:p>