Erschienen:
Cambridge University Press (CUP), 2022
Erschienen in:
European Journal of Risk Regulation, 13 (2022) 1, Seite 174-190
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.1017/err.2021.6
ISSN:
1867-299X;
2190-8249
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Beschreibung:
<jats:p>The latest Russian regulatory reform (2016) sought to introduce the risk-orientated approach – a move away from the “blanket inspections” (or the risk regulation reflex – a term coined by Blanc in 2011) method that has been criticised by the Russian business community. The present paper aims to assess its success using administrative data on federal watchdogs’ inspections. We argue that this reform ultimately failed in its goal regarding the overall number of inspections, and thus the volume of regulatory burden did not change significantly throughout the reform. This failure resulted from two mechanisms. First, the legal framing of the reform radically redefined risk as the probability of incompliance (as opposed to the likelihood of accident). Second, the watchdogs used key performance indicators that incentivised “street-level” inspectors to maintain the pre-reform regulatory burden levels.</jats:p>