Beschreibung:
<jats:p>Any purely phenomenological description of the human being as in some sense “finite” must avail itself of a concept of finitude that does not rely, implicitly or explicitly, on the concept of God. Theologically motivated descriptions, however, face no such dilemma; they can and, indeed, must avail themselves of some concept of the human creature as a finite being created in God's image (Gen 1:27 KJV). For there to be a meaningful difference between these two descriptions, the concept of finitude common to both must have a different sense in each. These are some of the methodological requirements Heidegger lays down in<jats:italic>Sein und Zeit</jats:italic>§10: “The Delimitation [<jats:italic>Abgrenzung</jats:italic>] of Phenomenology from Anthropology, Psychology, and Biology.” Heidegger's strategy for distinguishing the analytic of<jats:italic>Dasein</jats:italic>, in which the concept of finitude (<jats:italic>Endlichkeit</jats:italic>) plays a foundational role, from what he refers to as “the anthropology of Christianity” consists in distinguishing between two concepts of finitude: (1) finitude as lack or imperfection, defined as<jats:italic>ens finitum</jats:italic>relative to God as<jats:italic>ens infinitum</jats:italic>, and (2) an original concept of finitude, which, not being defined relative to God, is purely phenomenological and constitutes the horizon of any and all understanding of Being.</jats:p>