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Medientyp:
E-Artikel
Titel:
Team reasoning cannot be viewed as a payoff transformation
Beteiligte:
Colman, Andrew M.
Erschienen:
Cambridge University Press (CUP), 2024
Erschienen in:Economics and Philosophy
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.1017/s026626712200027x
ISSN:
0266-2671;
1474-0028
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Beschreibung:
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>In a recent article in this journal, Duijf claims to have proved that team reasoning can be viewed as a payoff transformation. His formalization mimics team reasoning but ignores its essential agency switch. The possibility of such a payoff transformation was never in doubt, does not imply that team reasoning can be viewed as a payoff transformation, and makes no sense in a game in which payoffs represent players’ utilities. A theorem is proved here that a simpler and more intuitive payoff transformation can mimic any theory that predicts what strategies players will choose in a well-defined game.</jats:p>