Beschreibung:
<jats:p> This study examines the relation between manager-shareholder agency costs and the decision to adopt a long-term performance plan. It is argued that firms with mature investment opportunity sets adopt performance plans to equate manager-shareholder planning horizons. It is also argued that firms undergoing strategic change adopt plans to reduce managerial exposure to risk. Logit analysis on a sample of 81 performance plan adoptions and a random sample of 78 nonadoptions indicates that firms with stagnant investment opportunity sets and firms undergoing strategic change tend to be performance plan adopters. There is also evidence that performance plan adopters have a higher incidence of lapsed stock option plans than nonadopters. Overall, the results indicate that there are systematic differences between performance plan adopters and non-adopters which appear to be related to the manager-shareholder agency problems faced by the firm. </jats:p>