Beschreibung:
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>The practice of horizontal <jats:italic>stare decisis</jats:italic> requires that judges occasionally decide cases “incorrectly.” What sustains this practice? Given a heterogeneous bench, we show that the <jats:italic>increasing differences in dispositional value</jats:italic> property of preferences generates gains when judges trade dispositions over the case‐space. These gains are fully realized by implementing a compromise rule—<jats:italic>stare decisis</jats:italic>. Absent commitment, we provide conditions that sustain the compromise in a repeated game. When complete compromises become unsustainable, partial compromises still avail. Moreover, judges may prefer to implement partial compromises even when perfect ones are sustainable. Thus, <jats:italic>stare decisis</jats:italic> is consistent with a partially settled, partially contested legal doctrine.</jats:p>