• Medientyp: E-Artikel
  • Titel: Organisms and the form of freedom in Kant's third Critique
  • Beteiligte: Fisher, Naomi
  • Erschienen: Wiley, 2019
  • Erschienen in: European Journal of Philosophy, 27 (2019) 1, Seite 55-74
  • Sprache: Englisch
  • DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12384
  • ISSN: 1468-0378; 0966-8373
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  • Beschreibung: AbstractIn the second half of the third Critique, Kant develops a new form of judgment peculiar to organisms: teleological judgment. In the Appendix to this text, Kant argues that we must regard the final, unconditioned end of creation as human freedom, due to reason's demand that we regard nature as a system of ends. In this paper, I offer a novel interpretation of this argument, according to which judgments of freedom within nature are possible as instances of teleological judgment. Just as individual organisms are to be regarded as governed by supersensible teleological laws, so too is nature as a whole to be regarded as given laws from a supersensible ground. This supersensible ground in the case of nature as a whole is freedom. Freedom and teleological judgments are to be regarded as unifiable with mechanism in the supersensible, and we are to subordinate mechanical explanations to teleological judgments as well as to freedom. This interpretation makes sense both of Kant's claim that he overcomes the “incalculable gulf” between nature and freedom in the third Critique, and also of the location of this argument, as following after and relying on the results of the Dialectic of Teleological Judgment.