Erschienen in:
European Financial Management, 26 (2020) 3, Seite 724-752
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.1111/eufm.12240
ISSN:
1354-7798;
1468-036X
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Beschreibung:
AbstractWe examine how product market competition (PMC) shapes chief executive officer's (CEO) power. Using various measures to capture both PMC and CEO power, our analyses, which include a quasi‐natural experiment, find evidence that CEOs have less power when the product market is more competitive. Furthermore, the impact of PMC on CEO power is more pronounced for firms with entrenched management, lower CEO ownership, lower analyst coverage, and for firms experiencing good ‘luck’ (windfall performance). Our results suggest that market power can act as a substitute for corporate governance in disciplining CEO power, particularly when prone to agency problems.