Beschreibung:
AbstractThe normalization of relations between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain had a major impact on other entities in the Middle East. One of the important players was the Al Thani administration in Qatar. This was the third time Doha needed to respond to a peace treaty with Israel. Every time, Qatar has chosen a different way. In the cases of both the Egypt–Israel peace treaty and the Abraham Accords, Doha objected. In the 1990s, however, the Al Thani regime supported rapprochement with Israel, for two reasons. The first was the opinion of the Palestinian community. The second was due to the objectives of the foreign policy of the emirate. In 1979, Qatar had to suit the norm in the Arab arena, in particular, Saudi Arabia. In 1990, it had to externalize Qatar's status in international affairs. In 2020, it had to ally itself with other Islamic states and organizations that opposed Israel, like Turkey. In order to understand Doha's point of view on the peace agreements, this article examines each one separately, as each has its unique features, causes, and consequences for the negotiations and the way they affected the years that followed. The article then identifies the recurring characteristics of the two earlier processes and their relevance to contemporary politics in the Persian Gulf.