Beschreibung:
<jats:p><jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">V</jats:styled-content>ladimir <jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">P</jats:styled-content>utin remains central to regime stability in the <jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">R</jats:styled-content>ussian <jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">F</jats:styled-content>ederation. However, the role that <jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">M</jats:styled-content>r. <jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">P</jats:styled-content>utin's personalist appeal—rooted in both charismatic and noncharismatic linkages—plays in maintaining regime support is undertheorized. I argue that personalism is a powerful political resource in electoral authoritarian regimes because it provides a positive logic for skeptical voters to support the leader. Personalist linkages obscure the role that electoral bias plays in shaping electoral outcomes, diminishing the impulse for mass postelection protest. When the effectiveness of personalism declines, discontented citizens are more likely to protest biased elections. This article shows that <jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">M</jats:styled-content>r. <jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">P</jats:styled-content>utin's appeal as a sound steward of the economy declined by 2012 but that other sources of issue satisfaction continued to shape some respondents' trust in the president.</jats:p>