Sie können Bookmarks mittels Listen verwalten, loggen Sie sich dafür bitte in Ihr SLUB Benutzerkonto ein.
Medientyp:
E-Artikel
Titel:
Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords
Beteiligte:
Edelman, Benjamin;
Ostrovsky, Michael;
Schwarz, Michael
Erschienen:
American Economic Association, 2007
Erschienen in:American Economic Review
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.1257/aer.97.1.242
ISSN:
0002-8282
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Beschreibung:
<jats:p> We investigate the “generalized second-price” (GSP) auction, a new mechanism used by search engines to sell online advertising. Although GSP looks similar to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, its properties are very different. Unlike the VCG mechanism, GSP generally does not have an equilibrium in dominant strategies, and truth-telling is not an equilibrium of GSP. To analyze the properties of GSP, we describe the generalized English auction that corresponds to GSP and show that it has a unique equilibrium. This is an ex post equilibrium, with the same payoffs to all players as the dominant strategy equilibrium of VCG. (JEL D44, L81, M37) </jats:p>